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HOW SALAZAR V. BUONO SYNTHESIZES THE SUPREME
COURT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRECEDENT INTO A
SINGLE TEST
Adam Linkner∗
INTRODUCTION
Atop Sunrise Rock, a large Latin cross1 casts a shadow over the Mojave
National Preserve in Southern California.2 This cross seems oddly out of place.
It is not located in a church. It is not located in a museum. It is located in a
national preserve that encompasses 1.6 million acres.3 There is no fence
surrounding the cross. There is no sign explaining why it is there. No other
religious or cultural markers are in the vicinity. The cross sits alone in the
middle of this vast public land. Does its presence on public land constitute a
violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause?4 Would the answer
change if the tiny parcel of land under the cross were transferred to a private
party? If so, would the reasons why the government transferred the land
matter?
The Supreme Court faced these facts in Salazar v. Buono.5 The cross in
Salazar was originally erected in 1934 by a veteran’s organization called the
Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”).6 Frank Buono, a former park ranger who
∗ J.D., Emory University School of Law (2010); M.B.A., Emory University Goizueta Business School
(2010); B.B.A., University of Michigan Business School. Thanks to Professor John Witte, Jr., whose help and
insight were invaluable to the development of this Article.
1 A Latin cross “has two arms, one horizontal and one vertical, at right angles to each other, with the
horizontal arm being shorter than the vertical arm.” Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
2 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010). Although the cross has recently been stolen, this
Article assumes the cross is still present. David Kelly, Mojave Desert Cross, Focus of Long Legal Battle, is
Stolen, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/local/la-me-mojave-cross20100512.
3 Mojave National Preserve, U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/moja/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2011).
4 The First Amendment Establishment Clause states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment also applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (stating that the
First Amendment applies to the states).
5 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1803.
6 Id. at 1811.

LINKNER GALLEYSFINAL

58

6/28/2011 9:43 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

was offended by the cross’s presence on federal land, challenged its
Constitutionality.7 The Supreme Court case of Salazar was the culmination of
four previous federal district court and court of appeals rulings on the cross—
Buono I,8 Buono II,9 Buono III,10 and Buono IV11 (collectively, the “Buono
cases”). In Buono I, the district court found that the cross’s location on federal
land violated the Establishment Clause and granted injunctive relief against the
government.12 Following Buono I, Congress passed legislation to transfer the
small piece of land under the cross to the VFW (“land-transfer statute”).13
Then in Buono II, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Buono I, although it chose not to
address the Constitutionality of the land-transfer statute.14 Buono then
challenged the transfer of the land containing the cross and, in Buono III, the
district court prohibited the transfer on the grounds that it did not, and would
not, cure the government’s Establishment Clause violation.15 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed in Buono IV.16 The U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar,
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court challenging both Buono’s standing to
bring the case as a now retired national park employee and the district court’s
injunction and finding of continued unconstitutionality despite the land sale.17
The Supreme Court in Salazar reversed Buono IV and remanded the case.18
In a jumbled set of seven separate opinions, the plurality, led by Justice
Kennedy, held that although Buono had standing, the district court did not
employ the proper Establishment Clause analysis and improperly extended its
first injunction against the cross to reach the land-sale statute as well.19 This
Article argues that, however convoluted the multiple opinions in Salazar
appear on first reading, they reveal that the Justices’ opinions together stand
for a single framework for addressing the Constitutionality of religious objects
on public land20—what this Article calls the “inside/outside” test. Pursuant to
the inside/outside test, a court must analyze the government’s actions from
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 1812.
Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
Buono v. Norton (Buono III), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010).
Buono II, 371 F.3d at 543.
Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 768.
Id.
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1803.
Id. at 1808.
See infra Part I.B.1 (examining Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Salazar).
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1819–20.
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both an inside and an outside perspective. The inside perspective asks a court
to determine if the predominant purpose or intent of a government action is to
promote religion. The outside perspective asks a court to look at a disputed
action from an outsider’s perspective to determine whether the effect of the
government’s conduct appears to endorse religion—regardless of actual intent.
After distilling this test from the Salazar opinions and the precedents on
which they call, this Article argues that the inside/outside test is not only
consistent with the apparent hodgepodge of Establishment Clause cases since
the Supreme Court’s seminal, multi-pronged approach in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,21 but the inside/outside test actually synthesizes that precedent into
a single test. Finally, this Article applies the inside/outside test to the facts of
Salazar as the district court is required to do on remand and concludes that the
district court should strike down the land-sale statute because it violates the
Establishment Clause.
I. DEVELOPING THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE TEST THROUGH AN ANALYSIS OF
SALAZAR V. BUONO
Salazar is the most recent Supreme Court case addressing the issue of
religious objects on public land. This Part first details the history of the Buono
cases that led up to Salazar. Then it analyzes the seven opinions issued by the
Court in Salazar. Finally, it argues that all of the opinions that deal with the
merits of the Establishment Clause actually agree on applying a single
framework, which this Article calls the inside/outside test.
A. The Buono Cases
The cross at issue in Salazar is “between five and eight feet tall” and is
permanently located on Sunrise Rock—a prominent location within the
Mojave National Preserve.22 It was originally erected with private funds by the
VFW in 1934 as a memorial to those who died in World War I.23 The cross has
since been replaced several times by private parties, although a plaque that was
originally next to it stating its purpose has not been replaced; the cross now
stands alone with nothing to indicate its purpose.24 Although veterans have
gathered at the cross to celebrate Easter sunrise services since 1935, there is no
21
22
23
24

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Id.
Id.
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evidence that veterans, or any other persons, have gathered at the cross for any
type of veterans memorial services.25
The public controversy surrounding the cross began in 1999 when the
National Park Service denied a request to erect a Buddhist shrine near the
cross.26 Subsequently, the American Civil Liberties Union threatened legal
action unless the cross was removed.27 After a National Park Service
evaluation concluded that the cross did not qualify for the National Register of
Historic Places, the Park Service decided to remove it despite significant
public opposition.28
In response to the Park Service’s decision to remove the cross, a U.S.
Congressman from California, Jerry Lewis, helped pass an appropriations bill
in 2000, which prohibited using federal funds to remove the cross (“AntiRemoval Act”).29 The next year, Congress passed another appropriations bill,
which designated the cross as a national World War I memorial and provided
$10,000 to install a memorial plaque next to the cross (“Memorial Act”).30
This bill made the cross the only national World War I memorial in the
nation.31 Congress passed another defense appropriations bill in 2002 that
included a section prohibiting the dismantling of the cross.32

25

Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1838 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Valerie Richardson, Mojave Cross Can Stay on Display in Calif., WASH. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010, 4:00
AM),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/29/mojave-cross-can-stay-on-display-in-a-preserve/
print. “None of the funds in this or any other Act may be used . . . to remove the five-foot-tall white cross
located within the boundary of the Mojave National Preserve . . . .” Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A–230 (2000).
30 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, §§ 8137(a), 8137(c), 115
Stat. 2278–79 (2002).
26

The five-foot-tall white cross . . . is hereby designated as a national memorial commemorating
United States participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.
....
. . . The Secretary of the Interior shall use not more than $10,000 . . . to acquire a replica of the
original memorial plaque . . . .
Id.
31

Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1842 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008). “Congress passed a defense appropriations bill that
included a provision barring the use of federal funds ‘to dismantle national memorials commemorating United
States participation in World War I.’” Id. (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1151 (2002)).
32
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Meanwhile, Buono, a Christian and the former Assistant Superintendent of
the Mojave National Preserve, filed Buono I in 2001 against the U.S.
Department of the Interior, the National Park Service, and the Mojave National
Preserve to challenge the presence of the Latin cross in the Preserve.33 Buono
claimed that the cross’s display on public land violated the Establishment
Clause.34
1. Buono I
In its 2002 Buono I decision, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California held that the presence of the cross at Sunrise
Rock violated the Establishment Clause.35 The court explained that even
though the cross is officially a war memorial, the cross’s presence was
unconstitutional because a reasonable observer would view the cross to be an
endorsement of religion.36 The district court issued an injunction prohibiting
the display of the cross and granted declaratory relief in favor of Buono.37
Congress did not like the district court’s decision in Buono I.38 In response,
Congress passed another appropriations bill that included a section requiring
the government to transfer the land under the cross to the VFW in exchange for
a privately-owned five-acre parcel elsewhere in the reserve.39 The land-transfer
statute states:
In exchange for the private property [consisting of five acres next to
the Preserve] the Secretary of the Interior shall convey to the [VFW
the
land
containing
the
cross].
Notwithstanding
the
conveyance . . . the Secretary shall continue to carry out the
40
responsibilities of the Secretary under [the Memorial Act].

33

Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1204. This Article does not discuss issues related to mootness or state
action. See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic Religious Speech, 82
DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 215 (2004), for a discussion of these issues.
34 Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1203–04, 1207–08.
35 Id. at 1217. The court did not consider the transfer of the land under the cross until Buono III. See
generally Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
36 Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215, 1217.
37 Id. at 1217.
38 Jesse Merriam, Salazar v. Buono: Can Government Give One Religion’s Symbol Prominence in a
Public Park?, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 24, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1353/salazar-buonoestablishment-clause-religious-display.
39 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1100
(2003).
40 Id.
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This transfer left “a little donut hole of land with a cross in the midst of a
vast federal preserve.”41 It also required the federal government to spend
$10,000 on a plaque after the transfer in accordance with the Memorial Act.42
The land-transfer statute also included a reversionary clause, stating:
The conveyance . . . shall be subject to the condition that the recipient
maintain the conveyed property as a memorial . . . . If the Secretary
determines that the conveyed property is no longer being maintained
as a war memorial, the property shall revert to the ownership of the
43
United States.

Thus, it effectively required the VFW to retain the cross by maintaining the
property as a war memorial.
2. Buono II
The Ninth Circuit in Buono II chose not to rule on the effect of transfer
under the land-transfer statute and simply affirmed Buono I.44 The Ninth
Circuit, relying on one of its earlier decisions that prohibited a cross on public
land,45 held that a reasonable observer would view a lone cross on public land
to be an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.46 This decision was not
appealed.47 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s determination in Buono II that the
presence of the cross on federal land is a violation of the Establishment Clause
became final.48

41

Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008).
Buono II, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text
(explaining the Memorial Act).
43 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1100
(2003).
44 Buono II, 371 F.3d at 543.
45 Separation of Church & State Comm. v. Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a cross on
public land violated the Establishment Clause because a reasonable observer might view the cross as showing
a governmental preference of religion; this was despite the fact that the cross was clearly marked with a plaque
saying it was a war memorial).
46 Buono II, 371 F.3d at 548–50. Additionally, the court’s dicta explained that because over ninety
percent of the 1.6 million acres of the Mojave National Preserve are federally owned, a reasonable observer
would believe the cross is on public land. Id. at 550.
47 See id.
48 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010).
42
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3. Buono III
Following Buono II, Buono sued the government to prevent it from
transferring the cross to the VFW under the land-transfer statute.49 The United
States District Court for the Central District of California in Buono III agreed
with Buono and noted four “unusual circumstances” that made the transfer
unconstitutional.50 First, the district court found it unusual that the landtransfer statute gave the government reversionary rights if the land was used
for any other purpose than as a memorial with a cross.51 It found that clause to
be problematic:
[T]he government has tightly restricted the VFW’s use of the subject
property for one purpose and, more importantly, has reserved the
right to reassert ownership and repossess the subject property any
time . . . that the VFW is not adequately maintaining the Latin cross
52
as a World War I memorial.

Second, the Memorial Act, despite the transfer, still required the use of
federal funds to create a memorial plaque.53 The court explained that
“demonstrate[s] that the government is intent on preserving the Latin cross, the
primary symbol of Christianity, in the Preserve,” and it “compel[s] the
conclusion that the government reserved its rights to remain actively involved
with the Latin cross, even though the VFW has ownership of the subject
property.”54 Third, the land transfer was not executed through an open bidding
process, but instead the land was conveyed directly to the VFW, the group
actively seeking to keep the cross.55 To the court, this conveyance
“demonstrate[d] that the government’s apparent endorsement of a particular
religion ha[d] not actually ceased” and the court could “only conclude that,
under these circumstances, the VFW [was] ‘a straw purchaser.’”56
Finally, the court was troubled by the government’s substantial legislative
efforts to protect the cross.57 After listing the legislation that the government
passed, the court concluded that these “herculean efforts . . . can only be
49
50
51
52
53

Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1179.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278

(2002).
54
55
56
57

Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
Id.
Id. at 1180–81 (quoting Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 1181–82.
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viewed as an attempt to keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without
actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause violation.”58 The district
court explained that because of these unusual circumstances, the transfer was a
violation of the Establishment Clause and enjoined it.59
4. Buono IV
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Buono III, enjoined the transfer, and ordered the
government to comply with the original injunction from Buono I.60 The Ninth
Circuit focused on three aspects of the proposed transfer that it found to be
unconstitutional: (1) the government’s continued oversight over the cross
because of the reversionary clause in the land-transfer statute; (2) the details of
the transfer itself; and (3) the significant legislative efforts to preserve the
cross.61
First, the Ninth Circuit found that the reversionary clause in the landtransfer statute enabled the government to exercise substantial control over the
cross after the transfer.62 Second, it explained that Congress’s decision to
authorize the land transfer in a provision buried in an appropriations bill, and
its choice not to conduct an open public bidding, evidenced that the VFW was
a “straw” purchaser.63 Additionally, the court was disturbed that the transfer
would give the VFW only a tiny piece of land without any distinguishing
marks, such as a fence, to clarify that it is not part of the Mojave National
Preserve.64
Finally, Buono IV found the government’s “herculean efforts” to preserve
the cross to be evidence of an illegal endorsement of religion.65 The repeated
legislative attempts66 to evade the injunction and keep the cross in place, and
continued government spending on the cross to create a plaque,67 would lead a
58

Id. at 1182.
Id.
60 Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008).
61 Id. at 779.
62 Id. at 780–81 (relying on Fourth Circuit and Fifth Circuit case law stating that a reversionary clause
results in government control of property even after it transfers the property); see Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d
710 (4th Cir. 1964); Hampton v. Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
63 Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 781–82.
64 Id. at 783.
65 Id. at 782.
66 See supra Part I.A (discussing the legislative efforts to preserve the cross).
67 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text (explaining how the land-transfer statute requires the
federal government to spend funds to install a plaque after the transfer).
59

LINKNER GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 9:43 AM

SALAZAR V. BUONO

65

reasonable observer, aware of this legislative history, to believe that the
government is endorsing religion.68 Therefore, the court held that the proposed
transfer did not cure the Establishment Clause violation found in Buono II.69 It
affirmed the district court’s ruling and required that the government not permit
the display of the cross.70 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
hear the government’s appeal of Buono IV.71 In 2010, the Court issued its
ruling in Salazar.72
B. Examining the Salazar Opinions
The Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Salazar reversed Buono IV and
remanded the case.73 Justice Kennedy presented the judgment of the Court,
which held that the district court did “not engage in the appropriate inquiry.”74
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion,75 Justice Alito filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,76 and Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.77
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg and Justice Sotomayor, filed a
dissenting opinion,78 and Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion.79
1. Justice Kennedy’s Announcement of the Judgment
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
delivered the judgment of the case.80 Before discussing the merits of the case,
Justice Kennedy stated that Buono had standing in Salazar as a proper way to

68

Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 782 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 779–82.
70 Id. at 782.
71 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
72 Id. The case name switched from Buono v. Kempthorne to Salazar v. Buono because Ken Salazar
replaced Dirk Kempthorne as the U.S. Secretary of the Interior. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
Secretary Kempthorne Applauds Nomination of Senator Salazar (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.doi.gov/archive/
news/08_News_Releases/121708a.html.
73 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821.
74 Id. at 1816.
75 Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
76 Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
77 Id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
78 Id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 1842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 1811 (majority opinion).
69
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enforce the injunction and final judgment established in Buono I and Buono
II.81
After reviewing the merits of the case, Justice Kennedy reversed and
remanded because the district court did not employ the proper analysis.82
According to Justice Kennedy, the land-transfer statute created a substantial
change in circumstances between Buono I and Buono III because the
government was required to transfer the land under the cross to a private
party.83 Justice Kennedy also believed that the district court improperly
dismissed Congress’s motives as illicit without properly considering why
Congress passed the land-transfer statute.84 Justice Kennedy explained that a
proper analysis of the government’s motives would have considered that
Congress may have wanted to protect the cross not for its religious purposes,
but for its historical meaning as a war memorial and gathering place for the
public.85 His opinion recognized the difficult predicament that Congress was
in—it needed to comply with an injunction prohibiting it from displaying the
cross, but it also wanted to respect a monument honoring veterans of World
War I.86 The Court noted that the cross is the only national memorial honoring
the American soldiers killed in World War I and that it is reasonable to
interpret that Congress intended to honor that historical meaning in transferring
the cross rather than tearing it down.87
Justice Kennedy also instructed the district court to consider in its analysis
a hypothetical reasonable observer.88 This observer would be aware that
Congress faces a difficult situation involving competing issues: a desire to
respect the monument versus a desire to respect the Establishment Clause.89
Additionally, this observer should not only focus on the religious aspects of the
cross, but also consider the changes resulting from the land-transfer statute as
well as how time may have played a role in changing the cross’s meaning in
the “public consciousness.”90 Finally, Justice Kennedy said it was incumbent

81 Id. at 1814–16. Justice Kennedy noted that his opinion was not meant to be an endorsement of the
lower courts’ rulings in Buono I and Buono II. Id. at 1818.
82 Id. at 1816.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1817.
86 Id. at 1820.
87 Id. at 1817.
88 Id. at 1819–20.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1817, 1819.
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on the district court to have considered less drastic relief to cure the
Establishment Clause violation—such as requiring the VFW to erect a sign
indicating its ownership of the land—rather than completely invalidating the
land-transfer statute.91
2. Chief Justice Roberts’s Concurrence
Chief Justice Roberts gave a one paragraph concurrence.92 He stated that he
did not see a difference between the government’s actions here and the multistep process of tearing down the cross, selling the land, and then having the
VFW re-erect the cross on its now private land.93 He applauded Congress for
skipping that empty ritual by just transferring the land.94 Although this opinion
alone does not add much to clarify how to approach a potential Establishment
Clause violation, because he signed onto Justice Kennedy’s opinion, he clearly
agrees with Justice Kennedy’s framework.
3. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito also agreed with Justice Kennedy’s approach, but stated that
he would go one step further and hold the land-transfer statute Constitutional.95
According to Justice Alito, the factual record was sufficiently established to
apply the framework from Justice Kennedy’s opinion, and he argued that if the
Court were to do so, then the land-transfer statute would be Constitutional.96
Justice Alito did not believe that Congress’s purpose in passing the landtransfer statute was improper.97 He rejected the district court’s finding that
Congress passed the land-transfer statute to promote a religious message.98
Instead, he found that Congress’s purpose was to honor the World War I
soldiers and to protect a national monument.99 Rather than delving into why he

91

Id. at 1820.
Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
93 Id. The body of this Article does not directly address this argument. It is clear, however, that this ritual
makes a difference under the inside/outside test because if the government decided to tear down the cross, it
would affect how a reasonable observer would view the land transfer. Additionally, it would show that the
government’s motive in the land transfer was not to maintain the cross.
94 Id.
95 Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1824.
98 Id.
99 Id.
92
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believed this to be true, Justice Alito simply deferred to Congress.100 He noted
that the land-transfer statute was very popular,101 that Congress has generally
shown notable concern for the rights of minorities,102 and that congressional
land transfers and exchanges are common in the western states with their vast
tracts of federal land and national parks.103
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito constructed a hypothetical reasonable
observer that would be aware of the history and pertinent facts surrounding the
display.104 According to Justice Alito, this reasonable observer would know
that the cross is on private land after the transfer and would appreciate that the
government transferred the cross to sever any endorsement of a religious
message that an observer would read into the cross.105 Additionally, he said
that although a cross can have a religious meaning, a reasonable observer here
would understand the cross was a commemoration of those who died in World
War I.106 He noted that in this part of the country, it is common for there to be
no demarcations distinguishing private and public land.107 He also explained
that taking down the cross could be viewed as hostile to religion.108
4. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that Buono lacked
standing in his opinion which only addressed that issue.109 Justice Scalia
argued that enjoining the transfer of the land in Buono III and Buono IV was
beyond the scope of the injunction from Buono I and Buono II.110 Thus, Justice
Scalia explains, the land transfer is a new case and Buono must possess
independent grounds for standing.111 Justice Scalia argued that because the
VFW could take down the cross after the transfer, or because the cross would
be on private property after the transfer, Buono has failed to allege any actual

100

Id. at 1821.
The land-transfer statute passed 95 to 0 in the Senate and 407 to 15 in the House. Id. at 1823.
102 Id. at 1824.
103 Id. at 1823.
104 Id. at 1824 (citing Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which says to look to Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005), for determining a reasonable observer’s awareness of the history surrounding the display).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1822.
107 Id. at 1821.
108 Id. at 1822–23.
109 Id. at 1824 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
110 Id. at 1824–25.
111 Id.
101
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or imminent injury.112 Therefore, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would not
just remand the case, but dismiss it.113
5. Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, wrote
the dissenting opinion that addressed the merits of Salazar.114 According to
Justice Stevens, Buono had standing as a way to enforce the injunction and
final judgment from Buono I and Buono II.115 Although he “agree[d] with the
plurality’s basic framework” for addressing the issue, Justice Stevens argued
that the Court should have affirmed the lower court’s decision because the
transfer would not cure the government’s Establishment Clause violation.116
Justice Stevens found that the transfer was unconstitutional for “two
independently sufficient reasons.”117 First, he found that Congress’s purpose
for the transfer was to preserve the display of the cross.118 To do this, Justice
Stevens explained that a court must look at the “indicia of [Congress’s]
intent.”119 After reviewing the record, Justice Stevens found that the
government’s intent in the transfer was to preserve the cross.120 He pointed out
that even the government admitted that Congress’s goal in the transfer was to
preserve the cross.121 Thus, he explained, from looking inside the
government’s actions it was apparent the transfer had an illicit purpose.122
Second, Justice Stevens explained that even after the transfer, a reasonable
observer would view the cross as a government endorsement of religion.123 He
argued that a reasonable observer under these circumstances would view the
government’s actions as an Establishment Clause violation for multiple
reasons.124 This included the facts that Congress transferred the cross to a

112

Id. at 1825–27.
Id. at 1824.
114 Id. at 1828 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1829–30.
116 Id. at 1830, 1841–42. Justice Stevens points out that the “plurality does not conclude to the contrary,”
but rather that the district court did not conduct the proper analysis. Id. at 1832–33.
117 Id. at 1832.
118 Id. at 1831.
119 Id. at 1840.
120 Id. at 1831.
121 Id. at 1837–38.
122 Id. at 1831.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1832–35.
113
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specific purchaser so that the cross could be displayed in the same location and
that the government retained a reversionary interest.125 Additionally, Justice
Stevens explained that changing the ownership of the land under the cross does
not change the character of the cross because the government has adopted the
cross as its own—whether on public land or private land—by making it the
only national World War I memorial with the Memorial Act.126
6. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer’s dissent argued for affirming Buono IV based on the law of
injunctions.127 Justice Breyer found that the court’s injunction in Buono III
forbidding the land transfer was properly a way to enforce the original
injunction from Buono I.128 Thus, he said that the Court should not have
granted certiorari to hear the case.129
7. The Overall Holding of Salazar
Buono had standing to challenge the land-transfer statute by a seven-to-two
margin,130 but Buono IV was reversed by a narrow five-to-four margin.131
However, with only three justices declaring the land-transfer statute
Constitutional or unchallengeable,132 and only three declaring it
unconstitutional,133 the district court was tasked with determining the statute’s
Constitutionality.
C. The Inside/Outside Framework Underlying the Opinions in Salazar
Despite their wide discordance, all the opinions in Salazar that address the
Constitutional merits of the case apply the same two-part framework to

125

Id. at 1833–34.
Id. at 1834–35.
127 Id. at 1842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1843, 1845.
129 Id. at 1845.
130 Justices Scalia and Thomas were in the minority. Id. at 1824 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
131 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer were in the minority. Id. at 1828 (Stevens,
Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132 Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that the statute was unchallengeable. Id. at 1824–28 (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito argued that the transfer was Constitutional. Id. at 1821–
24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
133 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor argued that the transfer was unconstitutional. Id. at 1831–
32 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
126
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determine whether the government is in violation of the Establishment
Clause.134 The Court looked inside the government’s purpose to determine the
motives for its actions and looked at the government’s action from an
outsider’s perspective to determine if a reasonable observer would view the
government’s actions to be a violation of the Establishment Clause.135 This
Article denominates this the “inside/outside” test.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is a textbook statement of this inside/outside
test. First, he criticized the district court’s simple assumption that the
government’s purpose in transferring the land was illicit.136 The district court
failed to properly look inside the government’s actual motive and intent137—
the inside analysis. Second, he criticized the district court for failing to
consider how a hypothetical reasonable observer would view the effect of the
land-transfer statute and the history of the monument138—the outside analysis.
In Justice Kennedy’s formulation, the hypothetical reasonable outsider must be
aware of all the circumstances and history surrounding the cross, not just a flat
view of whether a cross standing in a national park constitutes a governmental
endorsement of religion.139
Justice Alito accepted this same inside/outside framework, but he went one
step further and applied the inside/outside test to the facts. He found that a look
inside the government’s motives and intent did not reveal an improper purpose,
and that a reasonable outsider would not view the transfer to be a violation of
the Establishment Clause.140
Justice Stevens’s dissent also agreed with Justice Kennedy’s inside/outside
framework. Like Justice Alito, Justice Stevens applied the test to the facts in
this case, but came to an opposite conclusion.141 After looking inside at the
government’s motives and intent, Justice Stevens found that Congress’s real
intent was to continue displaying the cross more than it was to honor the war
dead with a suitable memorial.142 Additionally, he found that an outside
reasonable observer—whether or not the observer is aware of the cross’s
134 Id. at 1814–17 (majority opinion); id. at 1824–28 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1831–32 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
135 Id. at 1820 (majority opinion).
136 Id. at 1815–16.
137 Id. at 1816.
138 Id. at 1819.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1821–25 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
141 Id. at 1841 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1832–33.
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complex history—would conclude that the government is endorsing religion.143
Thus, although the Justices disagree about many things in Salazar, one thing
that they do agree on is that the inside/outside test is the framework that should
be applied to the presence of a religious object on public land.144
II. WHY THE COURT’S PRE-SALAZAR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRECEDENT
CAN ALSO BE SUMMARIZED THROUGH THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE TEST
Many courts and commentators argue that the Supreme Court has failed to
create a consistently accepted approach for determining if the government has
violated the Establishment Clause.145 This Part, however, argues that a careful
analysis of the modern Establishment Clause Supreme Court precedent reveals
that it can all be synthesized with the inside/outside test at work in the multiple
opinions of Salazar. This Part first lays out the Court’s pre-Salazar modern
Establishment Clause precedents that deal with issues of religious symbols on
public land. It then shows how the inside/outside test combines all these
historically inconsistent approaches.
A. The Lemon Test
The Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman146 is the most
well-known and commonly applied modern test to determine whether a
government action violates the Establishment Clause.147 At issue in Lemon
were two state statutes that required the government to reimburse private
schools—whether religious or secular—for the costs of teachers’ salaries,
textbooks, and other instructional materials relating to the teaching of certain
secular subjects.148 The Supreme Court held that those statutes provided aid to
religious schools and violated the Establishment Clause.149 The Court
143

Id. at 1832–33, 1841.
Id. at 1814–17 (majority opinion); id. at 1824–28 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1831–32 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
145 See, e.g., Budd, supra note 33, at 215 (explaining that, with reference to Establishment Clause tests,
“[t]he courts have . . . produced a patchwork of ad hoc and often irreconcilable dispositions reflecting a
considerable disparity of analytic rigor”).
146 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
147 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 212 (2007) (explaining that the Lemon test is usually used by the Court); Edith Brown
Clement, Public Displays of Affection . . . for God: Religious Monuments After McCreary and Van Orden, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 246 (2009) (“Most courts of appeals have concluded that the Lemon tripartite
test of purpose, effect, and entanglement still stands . . . .”).
148 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–07.
149 Id.
144
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combined its precedent into a fact-specific three-pronged test.150 Now, when
challenged, government conduct must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not create an
excessive government entanglement with religion.151 The Lemon test calls for a
stricter separation between church and state.152 Lemon established that even if
certain government support of religion was permitted in the past, it is no longer
permissible because of the widespread diversity in the United States.153 This
test is still the “touchstone” of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence154
even though some scholars have accused the test of being overly broad and
easily manipulated, and accused individual Justices of ignoring it in their
opinions.155
B. The Endorsement Test
The endorsement test is a variation of the Lemon test that explains how to
approach the outside analysis in the inside/outside test.156 Although Justice
O’Connor developed the test in her Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence in 1984,157
the Court first accepted it in 1989 in County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.158 This test clarifies Lemon’s
second prong159—whether an action has the primary effect of advancing or
150

Id. at 602–03.
See id. at 612–13.
152 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 194 (2d ed. 2005)
(explaining that “the Court gave the Lemon test a separationist reading” where there is to be a strict separation
between church and state, and “[t]his ‘separationist reading’ of the Lemon test guided most of the Court’s
disestablishment cases for the next fifteen years”).
153 Id. at 193 (“[E]venhanded accommodation and acknowledgment of religion is impossible in today’s
religiously heterogeneous society, even if it could have been permitted in the more religiously homogeneous
eighteenth century.”); Budd, supra note 33, at 187 (“[Lemon] reflects an undue hostility toward religion in the
public sphere.”).
154 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
592 (1989) (“This trilogy of tests has been applied regularly . . . .”); Weinbaum v. Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017,
1030 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Despite scattered signals to the contrary, the touchstone for Establishment Clause
analysis remains the tripartite test set out in Lemon.”).
155 See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 152, at 193 (explaining that the Lemon test is “amenable” to many
different interpretations). This problem is solved by the inside/outside test.
156 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
157 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (creating the endorsement
test and writing that a government action is in violation of the Establishment Clause “irrespective of
government’s actual purpose, [when] the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval”).
158 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
159 Although most scholars agree that the endorsement test is part of the Lemon test, this is not universally
accepted. Compare Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for
151
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inhibiting religion160—by explaining that the Constitutional inquiry is whether
the government’s action endorses religion.161 Further, the endorsement test
incorporates the third prong of Lemon—excessive entanglement—thus turning
the Lemon test into a two-part inquiry.162 In Agostini v. Felton, Justice
O’Connor refined the second “outside” step of this test a bit further.163 The
kind of evidence that should be considered in whether a government action
constitutes an endorsement of religion is whether the action results in: (1)
religious indoctrination; (2) religious line-drawing; or (3) excessive
entanglement between religious and political officials.164
The Court in County of Allegheny was faced with two government actions
that potentially violated the Establishment Clause: (1) the placement of a
crèche, which depicts the birth of Jesus, by itself in a prominent location in a
county courthouse; and (2) the placement of a Chanukah menorah, next to a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, just outside of a city building.165 The
Court applied the endorsement test to the crèche and the menorah.166 The
Court, looking at the factors a reasonable observer would consider in
determining the effect of the government’s decision to have each display, held
that the crèche violated the endorsement test while the menorah did not.167 To
determine how an outsider viewed the objects, the Court looked beyond the
symbols themselves and considered all of the surrounding circumstances.168
The prominent location of the crèche in a public building, its solitary presence,

Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1181–84 (2006) (explaining that the endorsement test is
a modification of the Lemon test), with Matthew J. Morrison, The Van Orden and McCreary County Cases:
Closing the Gaps Remaining Between the Established Lines of Ten Commandments Jurisprudence, 13 WASH.
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 435, 451 (2007) (suggesting that the endorsement test and Lemon test are
two separate tests).
160 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
161 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
162 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997); see also J. Brady Brammer, Religious Groups
and the Gay Rights Movement: Recognizing Common Ground, 2006 BYU L. REV. 995, 1008 (“The Court
restructured the Lemon test by combining the excessive entanglement prong with the effects prong. Thus the
new Lemon test has only two-prongs . . . .”); Christian W. Johnston, Agostini v. Felton: Redefining the
Establishment of Religion Through a Modification of the Lemon Test, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 407 (1999) (discussing
the Court’s decision in Agostini); M. Craig Smith, A Bad Reaction: A Look at the Arkansas General
Assembly’s Response to McCarthy v. Boozman and Boone v. Boozman, 58 ARK. L. REV. 251, 275 (2005)
(“[T]he second and third prongs of the Lemon test . . . have now been combined into one under Agostini.”).
163 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
164 Id.
165 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 579.
168 Id. at 595.
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and its use for religious activities such as caroling would cause an outsider to
believe that the crèche was a governmental endorsement of religion.169 In
contrast, an outsider would not view the menorah to be an endorsement of
religion because it was surrounded by other secular objects, it had a sign
disclaiming any religious purpose, and the city did not have a reasonable
alternative that was less religious in nature.170
The endorsement test is not only consistent with the inside/outside test, but
it in fact provides the analysis required for the outside analysis. Under the
endorsement test, the Court views potential violations of the Establishment
Clause from an outside perspective and asks whether a reasonable outside
observer would view the effect of the government’s action as an endorsement
of religion.171 The focus is on the effect of the government’s action, not the
purpose.172 This approach follows Lemon’s goal of limiting the role of religion
in the public sphere;173 even if the government’s conduct does not have a
religious intent, it is still unconstitutional if a reasonable observer would
believe the conduct has the effect of endorsing religion.174
C. The Historical Approach
The Court’s 1984 decision in Lynch v. Donnelly175 created a historical
approach to the Establishment Clause. In Lynch, town officials joined private
merchants in erecting a Christmas display on a private park owned by a

169

Id. at 598–600.
Id. at 618–20.
171 Id. at 595 (“[T]he question is ‘what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display.’”
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984))).
172 Id.
173 See Budd, supra note 33, at 190 (arguing that the endorsement test has been criticized for being “too
protective of separationist interests”). Scholars have also argued that the endorsement test permits more
religion on public land because government conduct is allowed if it does not evince a message of endorsement.
Id. at 200. This argument is flawed because it ignores that the first prong of the Lemon test, which prohibits
conduct that does not have a secular purpose, still exists; the endorsement test just modified the second prong
of the Lemon test rather than replacing the entire test. See supra Part II.B (explaining the endorsement test).
174 See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (“[The Court] squarely rejects any notion that this Court will
tolerate some government endorsement of religion.”); EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 147, at 127 (“Nor does
this understanding of a public religious endorsement depend on what the public officials had in mind when
they chose to make the endorsement. A particular official or group of officials may not intend to contribute to
the disparagement of persons in their community and yet do or say something that constitutes such a
disparagement, just as an individual speaker might overlook or misunderstand the linguistic meaning of her
words.”); WITTE, supra note 152, at 197 (“[T]he endorsement approach might now well require judges to
outlaw the very legislative accommodations for religion that Justice O’Conner has so strongly favored.”).
175 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
170
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nonprofit organization.176 The display contained many figures, including a
Christmas tree, clowns, candy-striped poles, Santa Clauses, and the like, most
of which of were donated by the merchants.177 The display also included a
crèche that the city had purchased some forty years before and had put up each
year as part of this larger display.178 In determining the Constitutionality of the
crèche, instead of rigidly following the Lemon test, the Court looked at the
history, origins, and public views of the object to determine if its placement
was a violation of the Establishment Clause.179 The Court held that the crèche,
in this setting, was only meant to depict the history of the Christmas season
and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause.180
In the Court’s 2005 decision in Van Orden v. Perry,181 Chief Justice
Rehnquist expanded upon the historical approach created in Lynch v. Donnelly.
In Van Orden, a Ten Commandments monument was one of seventeen
monuments and twenty-one historical markers on public grounds surrounding
the Texas state capitol.182 The Court held that the presence of a Ten
Commandments monument did not violate the Establishment Clause.183 In
permitting the monument, the Court looked at its historical legal significance,
its acceptance in other public settings, and its passive placement among other
monuments.184 The approach applied in Van Orden, which has been criticized
by scholars,185 requires the Establishment Clause analysis to be “driven both
by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”186 Therefore, Van
Orden states that an Establishment Clause analysis not only includes the
setting in which the monument sits, but also its history.187
176

Id. at 670.
Id. at 668.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 678–80.
180 Id. at 680.
181 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
182 Id. at 686.
183 Id. at 681–83.
184 Id. at 689–91.
185 See, e.g., Shawn Staples, Nothing Sacred: In Van Orden v. Perry, the United States Supreme Court
Erroneously Abandoned the Establishment Clause’s Foundational Principles Outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 783 (2006) (arguing that Van Orden goes against Supreme Court precedent).
186 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
187 Id. Justice Scalia, in his McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky dissent,
argues unpersuasively for a pure historical approach. McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844, 905–07 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The argument is that religious symbols are part of U.S.
history, and this religious symbolism, especially when it goes unchallenged for many decades, is not
unconstitutional. Id. Under such an approach, the cross at Sunrise Rock would likely be Constitutional because
Christianity—and its symbol, a cross—is recognition of that heritage. This approach, however, is not
177
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The lower courts have had trouble applying the historical approach to
potential Establishment Clause violations.188 This is because courts have tried
to treat the historical approach as an Establishment Clause test,189 as many
scholars recommended.190 However, it should not be considered its own test.
Rather, Van Orden’s use of the historical approach should be read as an
addition to the endorsement test analysis. In the context of the endorsement
test, the historical approach simply adds “the nature of the monument
and . . . our Nation’s history” to the factors that a reasonable observer
considers.191 In fact, the endorsement test contemplated the addition of the
historical approach because the test presumes the reasonable observer is aware
of “‘the history and context’” of the conduct.192 Adding this approach to the set
of facts relevant to the endorsement analysis is consistent with its outsider
perspective because, as the Court has written, a reasonable observer takes
history into account.193

preferable to the inside/outside test because it would have the Establishment Clause only apply to religions that
are not part of U.S. history. See Budd, supra note 33, at 208 (“The proposition that permanent religious
displays should be upheld on the basis of mere longevity, however, has been widely repudiated . . . .”). For
example, a statue of Jesus Christ on public land in front of a courthouse would be Constitutional because of the
United States’s Christian history, but the exact same sized Buddha statue would not be because the United
States does not have a Buddhist history. This approach is not only contrary to the Constitution because it
allows the government to get around the Establishment Clause just because a religion has a long established
history, but it is also inconsistent with the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See WITTE, supra note 152,
41–70 (explaining that one of the major reasons that the Founders had for creating the Establishment Clause
was to end the influence of a long standing religion—the Anglican Church); supra note 153 and accompanying
text (explaining that even if the Court permitted government support of the religion in the past, it is no longer
allowed).
188 See Trunk v. San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing how the court is
unsure if Van Orden applies to a cross, and although the court calls Van Orden a test, it refers to Van Orden as
“the Van Orden exception,” and ultimately deciding to apply Lemon, Van Orden, and McCreary County); Am.
Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Garrard County, 517 F. Supp. 2d 925, 936 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (explaining that the
Supreme Court’s decisions, including Van Orden, has left courts “‘in Establishment Clause purgatory’”
(quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005))).
189 See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169, 248–49 (2005) (arguing
that the Van Orden decision did very little to clarify the Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
190 See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van
Orden, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93 (2007) (explaining that some lower courts have abandoned Lemon in favor
of an analysis based on Van Orden for historical religious monuments); Staples, supra note 185 (explaining
that the court abandoned Lemon and created its own test).
191 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
192 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (quoting Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
193 Id. (stating that a reasonable observer is aware of “the history” of the activity).
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Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in Van Orden appears to embrace
the idea that the historical approach should be viewed from the perspective of a
reasonable observer.194 He says the determination of an Establishment Clause
violation “is not a personal judgment.”195 Rather, it is based on the “context of
history . . . . [the object] communicates to visitors.”196 Justice Breyer bases his
reasoning on how a reasonable observer, taking history into account, would
view the monument.197 This language is similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
language in his majority opinion in Van Orden that considered “the history and
context” of the monument.198 Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Salazar agrees that the historical approach should be part of the outside
analysis because he cites to Van Orden when explaining how to construct the
reasonable observer.199 In brief, the historical approach, as developed in Van
Orden, adds an understanding of history and context to the outsider analysis
that a reasonable observer would have when the court employs the
endorsement test.
D. The Predominant Purpose Test
On the same day that the Court published its Van Orden decision, it created
the “predominant purpose” test in McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky.200 This test, like the endorsement test, adds a
twist to the Lemon test.201 Under the predominant purpose test, the first prong
of Lemon—the requirement of a secular purpose—should be judged by looking
at the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the disputed action, such

194 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
195 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
196 Id. at 702.
197 Id. (“[The monument] communicates to visitors that the State sought to reflect moral principles,
illustrating a relation between ethics and law that the State’s citizens, historically speaking, have endorsed.”).
198 See supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining a reasonable observer is aware of the history
and context of the conduct).
199 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct 1803, 1817, 1819–20 (2010).
200 McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates . . . [the]
Establishment Clause . . . .”) (emphasis added); see generally Shannon F. Barkley, U.S. Supreme Court
Upholds Secular Purpose Prong of Lemon Test, LAWS. J., Aug. 2005, at 3 (discussing the decision in
McCreary County).
201 See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 635 (“After McCreary County,
the first [prong of the Lemon test] is now the predominant purpose test.”).
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as its history and progression, to determine if the government’s stated secular
purpose is genuine or merely a “sham.”202
In McCreary County, the Kentucky legislature repeatedly tried to require
county courthouses to display the Ten Commandments.203 The government
argued that its purpose was to recognize how the Ten Commandments are the
foundation of U.S. law.204 Each time the lower court held the display to be
unconstitutional, the legislature changed the law just enough to comport with
what it believed was the law.205 In applying the predominant purpose test,
Justice Souter, writing for the plurality in McCreary County, held that the
Kentucky legislature’s repeated legislative attempts to display the Ten
Commandments showed that its stated secular purpose was a sham.206 The
Court said that because the legislature’s purpose in changing the law was to
ensure the continuation of the display, the Court determined that the
legislature’s intent was not to cure an Establishment Clause violation but rather
to find a way to keep displaying the Ten Commandments on its county
courthouse walls.207 The true or “predominant” purpose behind the Kentucky
law was to display a religious object and this violated the Establishment
Clause.208 Therefore, under the predominant purpose test, if a court determines
that the government’s actions show that its predominant purpose is to favor
religion—even if the government claims otherwise—the action violates the
Establishment Clause.
Some scholars argue that this approach cannot work because the true
purpose behind a law is unknowable and unpredictable.209 That argument was
unpersuasive to Justice Souter because “[e]xamination of purpose is a staple of
statutory interpretation that makes up the daily fare of every appellate court in

202

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 864; see also Jay A. Sekulow & Erik M. Zimmerman, Posting the Ten
Commandments is a “Law Respecting an Establishment of Religion”?: How McCreary County v. ACLU
Illustrates the Need to Reexamine the Lemon Test and Its Purpose Prong, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 25, 47
(2006) (“McCreary County reintroduced the previously discarded notion of ‘taint’ into First Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
203 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850–57.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 869–72.
206 Id. at 850–58.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 881.
209 See, e.g., Carmen M. Guerricagoitia, Innovation Does Not Cure Constitutional Violation: Charitable
Choice and the Establishment Clause, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 447, 462 (2001) (questioning,
skeptically, if it is “possible to discern the purpose of this legislation”).
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the country.”210 In fact, the Court has repeatedly held that a purported
government purpose is not the legislature’s true purpose.211 Although Justice
Scalia’s claim that the Court cannot always know whether a singular true intent
behind the law is correct,212 Justice Souter easily bypasses this argument by
pointing out that if the true intent is not readily apparent, it can be determined
through the eyes of a hypothetical reasonable observer.213 This means that a
court must look inside the government’s intentions based on the surrounding
circumstances to determine the legislature’s purpose. Thus, if a court cannot
actually determine the true purpose behind a law, it can decide what the
predominant purpose appears to be to a reasonable person.
Just as the endorsement test approaches Establishment Clause violations
from an outside perspective, the predominant purpose test approaches
violations from an inside perspective.214 The Court discerns the internal intent
of the legislature by determining the predominate purpose of the government’s
actions.215 Thus, this analysis determines the actual intent,216 or what the actual
intent appears to be, regardless of its effect. Even if the stated purpose behind a
law is not related to promoting religion, and the law does not have the effect of

210

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (“When a governmental entity
professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy . . . . it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to
‘distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.’”) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1980) (holding that a law
that required the posting of a Ten Commandments did not have a secular purpose despite the government’s
claimed secular purpose).
212 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia J., dissenting) (“[D]iscerning the subjective
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.”).
213 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 848.
214 Id. Additionally Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which provided the plurality in McCreary County,
explained the outside endorsement test is still to be applied in addition to the inside analysis. Id. at 883–84
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing that the Ten Commandments display is unconstitutional based on the
“reasonable observer” endorsement analysis created by her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly). See generally
Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments? McCreary, Van Orden, and the Future
of Religious Display Cases, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 357 (2006) (discussing the various Justices’ views in Van
Orden and McCreary County).
215 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 845.
216 Id. The Court has implied through dicta that a secret religious objective that is not apparent to a
reasonable observer is permissible. Id. at 863. Practically, this is not a relevant issue for a court because if a
religious motive is too secret for a court to notice, then it is not possible for a court to rule that the action is a
violation of the Establishment Clause. However, if somehow the unknowable secret improper motive was
known to a court, it seems a court would have to hold the action unconstitutional because “[a] government
action must have ‘a secular . . . purpose.’” Id. at 864 (emphasis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612 (1971)).
211
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promoting religion, a law is unconstitutional if a court believes its actual intent
is to give preference to religion.217
E. Summarizing the Supreme Court’s Precedent with the Inside/Outside Test
At first glance, there appears to be a disjointed set of Establishment Clause
tests. As the foregoing analysis shows, however, the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause precedent, at least as applied to issues of religious
symbols displayed on public land, can actually be summarized by the
inside/outside test at work in Salazar.
Lemon’s prongs, as modified into a two-part analysis,218 can be understood
as the base of the inside/outside test, where a court uses:219
(1) an inside approach that applies Lemon’s secular purpose prong, as
modified by the predominant purpose test; and
(2) an outside approach that applies Lemon’s primary effect prong, as
modified by the endorsement test and the historical approach.220
The inside approach looks into the government action and determines
whether the primary purpose is to favor, endorse, or privilege religion in a way
that violates the Establishment Clause, regardless of the effect.221 It
incorporates McCreary County by applying its inside approach to Lemon’s first
prong.222 This approach reviews not only the actual wording or official
legislative history of the challenged statute or policy, but it also considers the
background to the legislative conduct, the unofficial statements and actions
that help evince the legislators’ intent, and the totality of circumstances that
have given rise to the challenged government action.223 This includes
reviewing the government’s actions while the case is being litigated or pending
and making a judgment whether those actions were a good faith effort to cure

217 See id. at 900–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s inquiry “focuses not on the actual
purpose of government action, but the ‘purpose apparent from government action’”).
218 See supra note 162 (explaining that Agostini combined the second and third prongs of Lemon).
219 A court can choose to apply either approach first. The order does not matter.
220 The third prong, excessive entanglement, is no longer a separate inquiry because its reasoning is
incorporated into the endorsement test. See supra note 162 (explaining that the second and third prong are
combined by the endorsement test).
221 See supra Part II.D (explaining the predominant purpose test).
222 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997).
223 Id.
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an unintended unconstitutional condition or mere stratagem to veil its religious
preferences enough to escape Constitutional infirmity.224
The outside approach uses the concept of an objective outsider to look at
the government conduct to determine what the effect of the conduct is,
regardless of its actual intent.225 Here, a reasonable observer is created who
looks at all of the facts surrounding the government action, including history
and context, to determine whether the government is primarily endorsing
religion versus achieving some other Constitutionally licit goal or policy.226
Thus, under the inside/outside test, a court looks at an issue from the
inside—Lemon as modified by the predominant purpose test—and determines
if there is a violation.227 Additionally, a court looks at the issue from the
outside—Lemon as modified by the endorsement test and the historical
approach—and determines if there is a violation.228 Only if there is no
violation under either approach does the government action pass the
inside/outside test as being consistent with the Establishment Clause.229 By
utilizing this analysis, if the government’s intent is to endorse religion, or if the
government’s actions have the effect of endorsing religion, the Establishment
Clause is violated and the government’s conduct must be declared
unconstitutional. This fixes the original Lemon test’s problem of being easily
manipulated because this two-part test provides a simple and systematic
approach that ensures potential Establishment Clause violations are analyzed
from both appropriate angles.
As is shown above, the inside/outside test derived from Salazar is not only
consistent with the Court’s precedent, but the test also synthesizes its precedent
into a single framework that is more easily applicable than the several
alternative approaches standing alone. With the inside/outside test, lower
courts will no longer struggle with the decision of whether to apply the Lemon,
Agostini, McCreary County, or Van Orden precedents—which individually can

224

Id.
Id.
226 See supra Part II.B (explaining the endorsement test).
227 See supra Part II.D (explaining the predominant purpose test).
228 See supra Part II.B (explaining the endorsement test). At least one scholar has argued that the
endorsement test also has an inside and outside approach. See Susanna Dokupil, “Thou Shalt Not Bear False
Witness”: “Sham” Secular Purposes in Ten Commandments Displays, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620
(2005) (arguing that the endorsement test also looks to the “intent of the speaker”).
229 See supra Part II.B (explaining the endorsement test).
225
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lead to very different results.230 Through the application of the inside/outside
test from Salazar, all of these cases can be applied in a single consistent and
systematic manner.
III. APPLYING THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE TEST TO THE FACTS OF SALAZAR V. BUONO
AS REQUIRED ON REMAND
The Supreme Court in Salazar remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the transfer should be enjoined as unconstitutional.231 The
Court previously explained that a Constitutional violation cannot be cured
simply by transferring public land to the private sector.232 Thus, the Court
required the district court to apply the framework provided in Salazar,233
which this Article demonstrates is the inside/outside test.
This Part explains the analysis that the district court should employ by
analyzing the land transfer using the inside/outside test. Since the Court’s
determination as to whether the cross should be a violation of the
Establishment Clause is final, this Part will not further discuss that issue. First,
this Part analyzes the facts from an outside perspective, and then it analyzes
the facts from in inside perspective. And from this analysis, this Article
concludes that the government’s attempt to transfer the land does not cure its
Establishment Clause violation.
A. Why the Transfer Is Unconstitutional from the Outside Perspective
To perform the outside analysis, a hypothetical outsider is created. This
outsider will be asked to view the government’s actions and evaluate whether
the government appears to be endorsing religion. This reasonable observer is
“aware of the history and all other pertinent facts relating to [the] challenged
display.”234 As such, the hypothetical outsider is also familiar with the origin
and history of the cross.235 According to Justice Alito, this information would
230 See Kristen Morgan, Comment, The Public Expression of Religion Act: Promoting Equality in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 543, 556 (2008) (“[The] application of each
[Establishment Clause] test can yield different results.”).
231 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1821 (2010).
232 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (“[W]e cannot but conclude that the public character
of this park requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth
Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law.”); Budd, supra note 33, at 236–56 (discussing
more in depth how the sale of land effects state action).
233 Evans, 382 U.S. at 302.
234 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
235 Id.
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include knowledge that the cross would be on private land.236 Although Justice
Stevens’s dissenting opinion assumes that the observer knows the cross is on
private land, he does not concede the point.237
First, let us assume the outsider is not aware that the cross has been
transferred to private property; even inspection of the site would reveal
nothing.238 Courts have consistently held that in order to prevent an observer
from believing that a religious object has the effect of a government preference
for or endorsement of religion, the land surrounding the private property and
object should be sufficiently demarcated as to be clearly separate from the
public property.239 Some examples of what could accomplish this are a
fence,240 signs stating the land is privately owned,241 natural physical
barriers,242 or the transfer of a large amount of land.243 More than one of these
measures is usually needed to achieve sufficient separation between what is
private land and what is government land.244 Because the transfer of the land
under the cross at Sunrise Rock would only have the effect of a change of
title—there is no demarcation such as a fence or sign and only a small amount
of land is being transferred—a reasonable observer could continue to view the
cross as part of the public land,245 and thus the transfer would not cure the
violation. Therefore, because the proposed transfer of the land under the cross
236

Id.
See id. at 1834 n.4 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
238 This is a reasonable assumption because, after the transfer, there is no requirement that the private area
be physically differentiated from the rest of the preserve. Cf. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494–95 (7th Cir. 2000) (treating a small piece of former parkland that contained a
Jesus statue that was sold to a private organization as though it was public land after the sale because a
reasonable observer would believe it to be public land because it was not physically or visually differentiated
from the rest of the park).
239 See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (explaining that a sign stating that the government does not
endorse an object’s religious message can help disclaim an endorsement of a religious message); Mercier v.
Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005) (allowing a Decalogue monument to stay because
of the “extensive effort made to distinguish the now-private property from the Park”).
240 See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (noting the land had two fences).
241 See id. (noting there are two signs that say the land is not part of the city).
242 See Kong v. San Francisco, 18 F. App’x 616 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that tree cover visually
differentiated the private land).
243 Cf. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008) (criticizing the government’s choice to only transfer
“a little donut hole of land with a cross in the midst of a vast federal preserve” so that the transfer would not be
considered a sham).
244 See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (having a fence and signs); Kong, 18 F. App’x 616 (having natural
separation and signs).
245 See Budd, supra note 33, at 240 (“It does little good to sell property underlying a religious symbol if
the change in ownership is apparent only to those who conduct a title search.”).
237
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would not delineate private property from the rest of the Mojave Nation
Preserve, an outside observer would view the cross as having the effect of the
government endorsing religion after the transfer.
Even if a reasonable observer were aware of the change in property
ownership from public to private, Congress’s decision not to require that the
land surrounding the cross be demarcated would cause an outsider to view the
government as endorsing religion.246 Incorporating Van Orden’s approach to
create the reasonable observer, a person aware of the history of the transfer
would know the government chose to transfer only a small parcel of land, to
keep a reversionary interest in the cross, and to make no efforts to clarify that
the land was now privately owned.247 These many efforts to protect the cross,
and to keep the cross associated with the government, would reasonably be
viewed by an outsider as an endorsement of religion.
This analysis holds true under the outside approach even if the government
truly had a secular motive in the transfer because an observer would
reasonably interpret that the effect of not requiring the VFW to demarcate the
land to be the government promoting a Christian message.248 Further, the
observer would impute to Congress an illicit intent because it chose to tuck this
controversial issue into a completely unrelated defense appropriations bill,
with no public debate.249 As explained by Justice Stevens, a reasonable
observer would know that “[t]he cross was once on public land, the
[g]overnment was enjoined from permitting its display, Congress transferred it
to a specific purchaser in order to preserve its display in the same location, and
the [g]overnment maintained a reversionary interest in the land.”250 From this
chain of events, the observer would perceive this to be an endorsement.

246 See Religion Found., Inc. v. Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that even if
someone knew the land was private, because of the lack of visual differentiation from the city property and
prominent location, the land creates a perception of improper endorsement of religion).
247 See Murphy v. Bilbray, No. 90-134, 1997 WL 754604, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997) (explaining
that the small size of a lot sold shows a preference of religion); Budd, supra note 33, at 240 (stating how a
government’s choice to not demarcate private land probably shows that it is not committed to separating it
endorsement).
248 Even though the city may want to keep the cross for historical reasons, it is still probable that the
citizens value it for the Christian message, which makes it is reasonable for others to view it in that way.
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 147, at 138. Thus, in situations like this, context is of utmost importance. Id.
For example, one looks to see if the land is set off or marked off. Id. at 138–39.
249 Id. at 138.
250 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1833–34 (2010) (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
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A number of specific facts taken together make clear that the land transfer
does not cure the violation. The reasonable observer would view the effect of
the extensive legislative efforts that the government went through to protect the
cross251 as a preference for religion. And even though the cross would be on
private land, the observer would know that the government maintained its
public character by making the cross continue to be a federal World War I
memorial—the only such memorial that exists.252 In addition, the cross is not
located where religious memorials for the dead would be expected, such as in a
national cemetery.253 Further, like the unconstitutional solitary crèche in
County of Allegheny,254 and unlike the Ten Commandments in Van Orden,255
this cross sits by itself without surrounding context that explains any nonreligious significance. A person aware of the cross’s history would also know
that it is regularly is used for religious gatherings such as Easter services, but
not for memorial services on days such as Veterans Day or Armistice Day.256
For all these reasons, the land transfer does not cure the Establishment
Clause violation from an outside perspective. As explained by Justice Stevens,
even if the government did not intend to violate the Establishment Clause, this
outsider test “‘imposes affirmative obligations that may require [the
government], in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as
supporting or endorsing a private religious message.’”257 Thus, even though

251 See generally Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a)–(f),
117 Stat. 1100 (2003) (granting the acre of land on which the cross stood to a private party); Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278–79 (2002) (establishing the
Mojave Cross as a national monument); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 133, 114 Stat. 2763A–230 (2000) (banning the use of government funds to remove the cross).
252 Nina Totenberg, High Court Weighs Legality of Memorial Cross, NPR: NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 7,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113532854.
253 The cross should not be viewed as the equivalent of thousands of smaller crosses, such as the ones that
can be seen as gravestones in a national cemetery, because a cross on a soldier’s gravestone represents the
religion of that soldier. However, to say that a cross represents those non-Christian soldiers who died in World
War I, such as the 3500 Jewish soldiers who died in that war, could be seen as insulting—just as requiring
Jewish soldiers in a national cemetery to have crosses as their gravestones could be seen as insulting to those
soldiers. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823 (2010) (citing JOSEPH G. FREDMAN & LOUIS A. FALK,
JEWS IN AMERICAN WARS 100–01 (5th ed. 1954)).
254 County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 574
(1989) (holding a crèche that sat by itself to be unconstitutional).
255 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (holding that a Decalogue that was one of many
memorials and part of a larger overall display to be Constitutional).
256 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1838 n.9 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
257 Id. at 1837 (quoting Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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Congress may have wanted their actions to pass Establishment Clause scrutiny,
an objective analysis of those actions prevents that from happening.258
Justice Alito’s outsider perspective reasoning in Salazar for allowing the
land-transfer statute is unpersuasive for two main reasons. First, although he
constructed a reasonable observer, he did not determine how the reasonable
observer would view the effect of the land-transfer statute.259 Second, he only
looked at the effect after the cross is transferred, rather than also looking at the
passage of the land-transfer statute itself.260
First, Justice Alito’s reasonable outside observer knows that the cross is on
private land—a questionable assumption261—and knows it is a monument to
soldiers who had died in World War I. Even accepting this as the appropriate
reasonable observer, Justice Alito did not take the critical next step and
determine whether this observer would consider the facts surrounding the
transfer to be an endorsement of religion.262 He did not consider how a person
could consider the government’s decision to make this cross the only World
War I memorial, and how its decision to put that memorial on private land so
that the cross would not be torn down, would be viewed as promoting religion.
Further, he did not fully consider how an outsider would view the effect of a
cross that is not demarcated as privately owned, that sits by itself because the
government will not allow monuments to be put up next to it, and that it is used
for religious, but not patriotic, services. Thus, Justice Alito did not give his
hypothetical outside observer all of the facts and he did not have the observer
fully interpret the facts that were provided.
Second, Justice Alito only looked at how the outsider would view the cross
after the transfer was complete, not whether the land-transfer statute itself
constituted an endorsement of religion.263 This is a fatal flaw, for it allows the
reasonable observer to ignore the factors discussed above—why the transfer
was tucked into a defense appropriations bill, why the government chose not to
require the demarcation of the cross, why Congress repeatedly acted to protect

258 Id. at 1839 (“The cross cannot take on a nonsectarian character by congressional (or judicial)
fiat . . . .”).
259 Id. at 1821–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
260 Id.
261 Id.; see also supra note 238 (explaining that it is reasonable to assume an outsider would not know that
the cross is on private land).
262 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
263 Id.
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the cross, and why the reversionary clause effectively restricted the VFW to
use their private land for a cross display and nothing else.264
In meeting the outside analysis, Justice Kennedy proposed a less drastic
remedy than the complete invalidation of the land-transfer statute, such as
requiring the instillation of signs to show the VFW’s ownership.265 Other
possibilities include demarcating the private land with a fence, getting rid of
the reversionary clause, or adding a sign stating that this is solely meant as a
memorial. Although requirements such as these could help with how the
outsider would view the cross after the transfer, they would not fix how an
outsider would view the land-transfer statute itself. It would be different if
Congress had put in these requirements. Because the reasonable observer with
knowledge of the cross’s history would know that Congress chose not to put in
these requirements to prevent the appearance of endorsement, a reasonable
observer would still view the land-transfer statute to be unconstitutional.
Further, as explained below, such requirements would not cure the inside
analysis showing that Congress had an improper motive when it passed the
land-transfer statute.
B. Why the Transfer Is Unconstitutional from the Inside Perspective
The government also continues to be in violation of the Establishment
Clause from an inside perspective. The intent or purpose of the land transfer,
regardless of its effect, was to promote maintenance of a religious symbol.266
Although determining whether a secular purpose is merely a sham is not
always easy,267 the government’s secular claim to transfer the land does not
seem to be sincere after examining the totality of the circumstances

264

Id.
Id.
266 Even though a court will not easily assume that the legislature has an unconstitutional motive, if there
is evidence of such motive, a court will treat the legislature’s stated intent as a sham. Compare Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“The courts
will . . . not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it.”), with McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S.
844, 864, 881 (2005) (holding that the Kentucky legislature’s repeated legislative attempts to display the Ten
Commandments showed that the legislature’s stated secular purpose was merely a sham). See generally
Dokupil, supra note 228 (discussing sham secular purposes in legislation).
267 See Dokupil, supra note 228, at 639 (explaining it is sometimes difficult to tell a sham purpose from a
legitimate purpose).
265
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surrounding the transfer.268 First, the land containing the cross was transferred,
through a non-neutral process, to a group dedicated to preserving the cross;
second, the government retained a reversionary interest; and third, Congress
went to multiple legislative lengths to protect the cross, including inventing the
idea—without debate—that this cross was a national memorial for World War
I veterans.269 An analysis of these facts makes it clear that every step the
government took was designed to ensure that the cross would not be taken
down.
The government’s intent is evidenced by its decision to transfer the cross to
a group devoted to keeping the cross—the VFW.270 The government’s decision
not to have an open bidding process shows that the predominant purpose of the
transfer was to preserve the cross rather than to transfer the land.271 If the
government just wanted to transfer the land then it would have had a neutral
sales process in which any qualified purchaser could have participated.272
Justice Alito argues that the government transferred it to the VFW to ensure
the land contained a World War I memorial.273 This argument is not persuasive
because open bidding could have included a requirement that a World War I
memorial of some sort be maintained on Sunrise Rock, but not necessarily this
cross. The government’s decision that the VFW would receive the land shows
it had a purpose other than just transferring the land. The fact that the
government likely would have received a better deal through an open bidding
process, because it gave up the prime land atop of Sunrise Rock for less
desirable land elsewhere in the preserve, provides additional evidence.274 This
improper intent becomes even more apparent because the bill passed after the
land-transfer statute once again prohibited the government from dismantling
the cross.275
The reversionary clause also shows the government’s illicit intent. This
reversionary clause of the land-transfer statute continues to give the

268 See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1840 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (“Our precedent
provides that we evaluate purpose based upon what the objective indicia of intent would reveal to a reasonable
observer.”) (citing McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005)).
269 See generally id.
270 Id. at 1812.
271 Id. at 1813.
272 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 147, at 135 (explaining that a neutral way of selling the land is
the fairest).
273 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
274 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 36, Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008).
275 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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government control over the cross because the land reverts back to the
government if the VFW removes it.276 Thus, the government, not the VFW,
controls the land and its religious object.277 Even if Justice Alito is correct that
the reversionary clause does not require maintenance of the cross278—which
would undermine his argument that the government just wanted to protect and
give respect to the existing memorial—it certainly encourages the VFW to
keep the cross.279 If the government did not intend to continue to have control
over the cross, the government would have acted as it has in other similar
situations and severed all ties.280
This improper motive is further substantiated from an insider’s perspective
because the land-transfer statute required continued governmental monetary
support for the cross by providing $10,000 to install a plaque.281 And, unlike
other laws requiring the installation of plaques that clearly demarcate the
religious object from public property, this plaque would only replace the
original one.282 Thus, it appears that the government’s actual purpose is to
continue to be associated with the cross both monetarily and by implication.
Moreover, the government’s multiple legislative attempts to preserve the
cross evidence its actual intent.283 The Court has previously found that such
repeated efforts can evidence an improper internal motive. In McCreary
County, the Court pointed to the legislature’s multiple efforts to maintain a
religious display as evidence that the stated secular purpose was a sham.284
Here, the Anti-Removal Act, the Memorial Act, the Defense Appropriations
Act of 2002, and the land-transfer statute, all attempt to maintain the cross.285
276 “The conveyance . . . shall be subject to the condition that the recipient maintain the conveyed property
as a memorial . . . . [Otherwise,] the property shall revert to the ownership of the United States.” 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 410aaa-56(e) (West 2011).
277 For example, this is not like the reversionary clause in Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d
693 (7th Cir. 2005), where private purchasers were required to maintain a fence and sign, showing the
separation between the public and private land. Id. at 697.
278 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
279 See id. at 1838 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (“If it does not categorically require
the new owner of the property to display . . . (the cross) . . . the statute most certainly encourages this result.”
(citation omitted)).
280 See, e.g., Mercier, 395 F.3d at 693 (building a fence, putting up signs, and not having a reversionary
clause that requires that the religious object stay in place).
281 See supra note 30.
282 Mercier, 395 F.3d at 697 (requiring signs be placed that stated the land was private).
283 See supra Part I.A (explaining the Memorial Act, Anti-Removal Act, and the land-transfer statute).
284 McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 869–71 (2005).
285 See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Garrard County, 517 F. Supp. 2d 925 (E.D. Ky. 2007)
(explaining that legislation responding to lawsuit evidence of a violation of the Establishment Clause).
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Like McCreary County, these legislative attempts to protect the cross, in
response to threatened and actual litigation,286 show that any stated secular
intent was a sham and the predominant purpose of the land-transfer statute was
to protect the cross.
We can further see inside the government’s purpose by the national status
that it placed upon the cross. By sanctifying it as the only national World War I
memorial,287 Congress ensured that the cross would continue to portray a
government message, regardless of ownership.
Justice Alito’s concurrence, which argued that an inside look does not
show an improper motive,288 is not persuasive because it failed to properly
apply the inside analysis that the Court requires the district court to follow. His
analysis fell into the pitfalls of presuming Congress’s motives were proper and
relying on irrelevant facts.
In determining Congress’s purpose, Justice Alito relied on how land
transfers are common in the western United States.289 However, even if they
are common, that does not mean that this land transfer was proper. The
argument is not that land transfers violate the Establishment Clause, but rather
that this one does. It is the facts surrounding this land transfer that the Court,
and Justice Alito, needs to look at. These surrounding facts, as explained
above, show that the motive for the land transfer was not proper, even though a
different land exchange could be proper.
Justice Alito also relied on Congress’s overwhelming support for the landtransfer statute.290 Although it passed easily, that does not mean Congress had
a proper motive in passing this statute. The popularity of the act does not
constitutionalize it. If support for the passage of legislation, even significant
support, meant that a law were Constitutional, then by definition no enacted
law would fail the inside analysis of the Establishment Clause test. Thus, this
reasoning would swallow up the rule. Further, as pointed out by Justice
Stevens’s dissent, the high support here most likely has to do with the transfer
being tucked into a war-funding bill.291
286 See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 869–72 (explaining that because the legislature passed new laws to
try to get around the Establishment Clause, they had an improper internal purpose).
287 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010).
288 Id. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 1828 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
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Justice Alito’s conclusion also depends on his understanding of Congress’s
history of respecting the rights of minorities.292 This is not only a debatable
assertion, but it does not explain anything about Congress’s internal purpose
for this law. Just like above, this reasoning would presume that all of
Congress’s future actions are proper and thus it would swallow up the rule.
Looking at all the facts, the evidence demonstrates the internal purpose of
the government’s actions was to maintain the cross rather than to extricate
itself from the cross. The government, in its oral arguments before the Court,
even admitted that its purpose was to preserve the cross.293
Overall, by applying the inside/outside test set forth by both the majority
and dissent in Salazar, it is clear that the government is still in violation of the
Establishment Clause. From the inside, the government had an improper
purpose when it transferred the land containing the cross. From the outside, the
government appears to favor religion with the transfer. Thus, on remand, the
district court should hold that the government continues to be in violation of
the Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court gave a jumbled set of opinions when it ruled
in Salazar, an analysis of the various opinions reveals that they all support—in
fact they all mandate—the framework that this Article distills into the
inside/outside test. This Article reveals that by examining the apparently
inconsistent Establishment Clause precedent through the inside/outside test, the
Court’s various rulings are actually consistent with each other. Finally, this
Article provides the analysis that the district court should employ when it
applies the inside/outside test to the facts surrounding the cross on Sunrise
Rock.
Because the inside/outside test provides a clear distillation of the Court’s
precedent, lower courts have one test that can consistently be applied to
effectively prevent the government from circumventing the Establishment
Clause. The inside/outside test accomplishes this through its two-part
approach: (1) a court employs an inside analysis to determine the government’s
intent; and (2) a court employs an outside analysis to determine how a
reasonable observer would view the effect of the government’s action. The
292
293

Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1831 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
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inside analysis, based on the primary purpose approach from Lemon, ensures
that the government is not able to cover up an endorsement of religion with a
superficial secular claim by looking at the intent behind the action.294 As
explained by the predominant purpose test from McCreary County, this
requires a court to look at what the internal purpose of the conduct is,
regardless of its effect.295 The outside analysis, based on the endorsement
approach to Lemon as modified by the historical approach from Van Orden,
protects the public’s trust in the government by prohibiting actions that appear
to have the effect of endorsing religion by using the idea of a reasonable
observer.296 This requires a court to look from the outsider’s perspective to
determine the effect action, regardless of its intent. This dual approach ensures
that the government and religion are fully separated.
Another benefit of the inside/outside test is that it is accepted by
ideologically divergent members of the Court. Every Justice that addressed the
merits of the Establishment Clause in Salazar agreed with this basic
framework.297 The only disagreement was with applying the facts of Salazar to
the framework.298 This Article, however, shows that from both an inside and an
outside perspective, the government continues to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Of course, applying these approaches leads to a very important question: If
it is not permissible to transfer the land containing an unconstitutional object as
attempted in Salazar, what is the government supposed to do with all of the
religious objects on public land that violate the Establishment Clause? The
answer is that the government’s actions must pass the inside/outside test. Just
because it may not be easy to comply with the Constitution does not mean that
the government can choose not to comply with the Constitution. This might
have been accomplished in Salazar by actually separating the government
from the cross when transferring the land. For example, if the land-transfer
statute did not have a reversionary clause, the transfer took place as a part of an
open bidding process, and the land was demarcated after the transfer, then the

294

See supra Part II.E.
McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005).
296 See supra Part II.E.
297 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1803–21; id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1821–24 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1824–28 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 1828–42 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1842–45 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
298 Id.
295

LINKNER GALLEYSFINAL

94

6/28/2011 9:43 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

government would have likely cured its violation. Another viable option is to
remove the cross and erect a secular war memorial.
Although the inside/outside test is designed to address religious symbols on
public property, it potentially has additional Establishment Clause
implications. Not only does it provide consistency for cases such as Salazar,
but the two-part analysis could provide consistency to the application of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally. In conclusion, the inside/outside
test provides courts with the tools necessary to fully analyze an Establishment
Clause question. With the adoption of this test and its consistent framework,
courts will be further empowered with the ability to promote and to protect the
Constitution.

